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Abstract. Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) solvers are now routinely used in the ver-
ification of large industrial problems. However, their application in safety-critical
domains such as the railways, avionics, and automotive industries requires some
form of assurance for the results, as the solvers can (and sometimes do) have bugs.
Unfortunately, the complexity of modern, highly optimized SAT solvers renders
impractical the development of direct formal proofs of their correctness. This pa-
per presents an alternative approach where an untrusted, industrial-strength, SAT
solver is plugged into a trusted, formally certified, SAT proof checker to provide
industrial-strength certified SAT solving. The key novelties and characteristics of
our approach are (i) that the checker is automatically extracted from the formal
development, (ii), that the combined system can be used as a standalone exe-
cutable program independent of any supporting theorem prover, and (iii) that the
checker certifies any SAT solver respecting the agreed format for satisfiability
and unsatisfiability claims. The core of the system is a certified checker for un-
satisfiability claims that is formally designed and verified in Coq. We present its
formal design and outline the correctness proofs. The actual standalone checker
is automatically extracted from the the Coq development. An evaluation of the
certified checker on a representative set of industrial benchmarks from the SAT
Race Competition shows that, albeit it is slower than uncertified SAT checkers, it
is significantly faster than certified checkers implemented on top of an interactive
theorem prover.
1 Introduction
Advances in Boolean satisfiability SAT technology have made it possible for SAT
solvers to be routinely used in the verification of large industrial problems, including
safety-critical domains that require a high degree of assurance such as the railways,
avionics, and automotive industries [9,15]. However, the use of SAT solvers in such do-
mains requires some form of assurance for the results. This assurance can be provided
in two different ways.
First, the solver can be proven correct once and for all. However, this approach
had limited success. For example, Lescuyer et al. [11] formally designed and verified
a SAT solver using the Coq proof-assistant [2], but without any of the techniques and
optimizations used in modern solvers. Reasoning about these optimizations makes the
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Fig. 1: High-Level View of an Industrial-Strength Formally Certified SAT Solver.
formal correctness proofs exceedingly hard. This was shown by the work of Maric´ [12],
who verified the algorithm used in the ARGO-SAT solver but restricted the verification
to the pseudo-code level, and in particular, did not verify the actual solver itself. In
addition, the formal verification has to be repeated for every new SAT solver (or even a
new version of a solver), or else the user is locked into using the specific verified solver.
Alternatively, a proof checker can be used to validate each individual outcome of the
solver independently; this requires the solver to produce a proof trace that is viewed as a
certificate justifying the outcome of the solver. This approach was used to design several
checkers such as tts, Booleforce, PicoSAT and zChaff [16]. However, these checkers
are typically implemented by the developers of the SAT solvers whose output they are
meant to check, which can lead to bugs being masked, and none of them was formally
designed or verified, which means that they provide only limited assurance.
The problems of both approaches can be circumvented if the checker rather than
the solver is proven correct, once and for all. This is substantially simpler than proving
the solver correct, because the checker is comparatively small and straightforward. It
does not lead to a system lock-in, because the checker can work for all solvers that can
produce proof traces (certificates) in the agreed format. This approach was followed
by Weber and Amjad [20] in their formal development of a proof checker for zChaff
and Minisat proof traces. Their core idea is to replay the derivation encoded in the
proof trace inside LCF-style interactive theorem provers such as HOL 4, Isabelle, and
HOL Light. Since the design and implementation of these provers is based on a small
trusted kernel of inference rules, assurance is very high. However this comes at the
cost of usability: their checker can run only inside the supporting prover, and not as a
standalone tool. Moreover, performance bottlenecks become prominent when the size
of the problems increases.
Here, we follow the same general idea of a formally certified proof checker, but
depart considerably from Weber and Amjad in how we design and implement our solu-
tion. We describe an approach where one can plug an untrusted, industrial-strength SAT
solver into a formally certified SAT proof checker to provide an industrial-strength cer-
tified SAT solver. We designed, formalized and verified the SAT proof checker for both
satisfiable and unsatisfiable problems. In this paper, we focus on the more interesting
aspect of checking unsatisfiable claims; satisfiable certificates are significantly easier to
formally certify. Our certified checker SHRUTI is formally designed and verified using
the higher-order logic based proof assistant Coq [2], but we never use Coq as a checker;
instead we automatically extract an OCaml program from the formal development that
is compiled to a standalone executable that is used independently of Coq. In this regard,
our approach prevents the user to be locked-in to a specific proof assistant, something
that was not possible with Weber and Amjad’s approach. A high-level architectural view
of our approach is shown in Figure 1. Since it combines certification and ease-of-use, it
enables the use of certified checkers as regular components in a SAT-based verification
work flow.
2 Propositional Satisfiability
2.1 Satisfiability Solving
Given a propositional formula, the goal of satisfiability solving is to determine whether
there is an assignment of the Boolean truth values (i.e., True, False) to the variables in
the formula such that the formula evaluates to true. If such an assignment exists, the
given formula is said to be satisfiable or SAT, otherwise the formula is said to be unsat-
isfiable or UNSAT. Many problems of practical interest in system verification involved
proving unsatisfiability, one concrete example being bounded model checking [4].
For efficiency purposes, SAT solvers represent the propositional formulas in con-
junctive normal form (CNF), where the entire formula is a conjunction of clauses. Each
clause itself denotes a disjunction of literals, which are simply (Boolean) variables or
negated variables. An efficient CNF representation uses non-zero integers to represent
literals. A positive literal is represented by a positive integer, whilst a negated one is
denoted by a negative integer. As an example, the (unsatisfiable) formula
(a ∧ b) ∨ (¬a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ ¬b) ∨ (¬a ∧ ¬b)
over two propositional variables a and b can thus be represented as
1 2 0
-1 2 0
1 -2 0
-1 -2 0
The zeroes are delimiters that separate the clauses from each other.
SAT solvers take a Boolean formula, for example represented in the DIMACS no-
tation used here, and produce a SAT/UNSAT claim. A proof-generating SAT solver
produces additional evidence (or certificates) to support its claims. For a SAT claim,
the certificate simply consists of an assignment. It is usually trivial to check whether
that assignment—and thus the original SAT claim—is correct. One simply substitutes
the Boolean values given by the assignment in the formula and then evaluates the over-
all formula, checking that it indeed is true. For UNSAT claims, the evidence is more
complicated, and the solvers need to return a resolution proof trace as certificate. Un-
surprisingly, checking these UNSAT certificates is more complicated as well.
2.2 Proof Checking
When the solver claims a given problem is UNSAT, we can independently re-play the
proofs produced by the solver, to check that the solver’s output is correct. For a given
problem, if we can follow the resolution inferences given in the proof trace to derive an
empty clause, then we know that the proof trace correctly denotes an UNSAT instance
for the problem, and we can conclude that the given problem is indeed UNSAT.
A proof trace consists of the original clauses used during resolution and the interme-
diate resolvents obtained by resolving the original input clauses. The part of the proof
trace that specifies how the input clauses have been resolved in sequence to derive a
conflict is organized as chains. These chains are often referred to as the regular input
resolution proofs, or the trivial proofs [1,3]. We call the input clauses in a chain its an-
tecedents and its final resolvent simply its resolvent. Designing an efficient checking
methodology relies to some extent on the representation of the proof trace produced
by the solvers. Representing proof chains as a trivial resolution proof is a key con-
straint [3]. The trivial resolution proof requires that the clauses generated to form the
proof should be aligned in such a manner in the trace so that whenever a pair of clauses
is used for resolution, at most one complementary pair of literals is deleted. Another
important constraint that is needed for efficiency reasons is that at least one pair of
complementary literals gets deleted whenever any two clauses are used in the trace for
resolution. This is needed because we want to avoid search during checking, and if the
proof trace respects these two criteria we can design a checking algorithm that can val-
idate the proofs in a single pass using an algorithm which is linear in the size of the
input clauses.
2.3 PicoSAT Proof Representation
Most proof-generating SAT solvers [3,7,23] preserve these two criterions. We carried
out our first set of experiments with PicoSAT [3]. PicoSAT ranked as one of the best
solvers in the industrial category of the SAT Competitions 2007 and 2009, and in the
SAT Race 2008. Moreover, PicoSAT’s proof representation is in ASCII format. It was
reported by Weber and Amjad [22] that some other solvers such as Minisat generate
proofs in a more compact, but binary format.
Another advantage of PicoSAT’s proof trace format besides using an ASCII format
is its simplicity. It does not record the information about pivot literals as some of the
other solvers such as zChaff. It is however straightforward to develop translators for
formats used by other SAT solvers [19]. As a proof of concept, we developed a translator
from zChaff’s proof format to PicoSAT’s proof format, which can be used for validating
unsatisfiability proofs obtained with zChaff.
A PicoSAT proof trace consists of rows representing the input clauses, followed by
rows encoding the proof chains. Each row representing a chain consists of an asterisk
(*) as place-holder for the chain’s resolvent,3 followed by the identifiers of the clauses
involved in the chain. Each chain row thus contains at least two clause identifiers, and
3 This is generated by PicoSAT; there is another option of generating proof traces from PicoSAT
where instead of the asterisk the actual resolvents are generated delimited by a single zero from
the rest of the chain.
denotes an application of one or more of the resolution inference rule, describing a
trivial resolution derivation. Each row also starts with a non-zero positive integer de-
noting the identifier for that row’s (input or resolvent) clause. In an actual trace there
are additional zeroes as delimiters at the end of each row, but we remove these before
we start proof checking. For the UNSAT formula shown in the previous section, the
corresponding proof trace generated from PicoSAT looks as follows:
1 1 2
2 -1 2
3 1 -2
4 -1 -2
5 * 3 1
6 * 4 2 5
The first four rows denote the input clauses from the original problem (see above)
that are used in the resolution, with their identifiers referring to the original clause
numbering, whereas rows 5 and 6 represent the proof chains. In row 5, the clauses with
identifiers 3 and 1 are resolved using a single resolution rule, whilst in row 6 first the
original clauses with identifier 4 and 2 are resolved and then the resulting clause is
resolved against the clause denoted by identifier 5 (i.e., the resolvent from the previous
chain), in total using two resolution steps.
PicoSAT by default creates a compacted form of proof traces, where the antecedents
for the derived clauses are not ordered properly within the chain. This means that there
are instances in the chain where we resolve a pair of adjacent clauses and no literal is
deleted. This violates one of the constraints we explained above, thus we cannot deduce
an existence of an empty clause for this trace unless we re-order the antecedents in the
chain.
PicoSAT comes with an uncertified proof checker called Tracecheck that can not
only check the outcome of PicoSAT but also corrects the mis-alignment of traces. The
outcome of the alignment process is an extended proof trace and these then become the
input to the certified checker that we design.
3 The SHRUTI Certified Proof Checker
Our approach to efficient formally certified SAT solving relies on the use of a certified
checker program that has been designed and implemented formally, but can be used in
practice, independently of any formal development environment. Rather than verifying
a separately developed checker we follow a correct-by-construction approach in which
we formally design and mechanically verify a checker using a proof assistant to achieve
the highest level of confidence, and then use program extraction to obtain a standalone
executable.
Our checker SHRUTI takes an input CNF file which contains the original problem
description and a proof trace file and checks whether the two together denote an (i)
UNSAT instance, and (ii) that they are “legitimate”. Our focus here is on (i) where
we check that each step of the trace is correctly applying the resolution inference rule.
However, in order to gain full assurance about the UNSAT claim, we also need to check
that all input clauses used in the resolution in the trace are taken from the original
problem, i.e., that the proof trace is legitimate. SHRUTI provides this as an option, but
as far as we are aware most checkers do not do this check.
Our formal development follows the LCF style [17], and in particular, only uses
definitional extensions, i.e., new theorems can only be derived by applying previously
derived inference rules. Axiomatic extensions though possible are prohibited, since one
can assume the existence of a theorem without a proof. Thus, we never use it in our own
work. We use the the Coq proof assistant [2] as a development tool. Coq is based on
the Calculus of Inductive Constructions and encapsulates the concepts of typed higher-
order logic. It uses the notion of proofs as types, and allows constructive proofs and use
of dependent types. It has been successfully used in the design and implementation of
large scale certification of software such as in the CompCert [10] project.
For our development of SHRUTI, we first formalize in Coq the definitions of res-
olution and its auxiliary functions and then prove inside Coq that these definitions are
correct, i.e., satisfy the properties expected of resolution. Once the Coq formalization is
complete, OCaml code is extracted from it through the extraction API included in the
Coq proof assistant. The extracted OCaml code expects its input in data structures such
as tables and lists. These data structures are built by some glue code that also handles
file I/O and pre-processes the read proof traces (e.g., removes the zeroes used as sepa-
rators for the clauses). The glue code wraps around the extracted checker and the result
is then compiled to a native machine code executable that can be run independently of
the proof-assistant Coq.
3.1 Formalization in Coq
In this section we present the formalization of SHRUTI. Its core logic is formalized
as a shallow embedding in Coq. In a shallow embedding we identify the object data
types (types used for SHRUTI) with the types of the meta-language, which in our case
happens to be the Coq datatypes.
Since most checkers read the clause representation on integers (e.g., using the DI-
MACS notation) we incorporate integers as first class elements in our formalization,
so we do not have to map literals to Booleans. Thus, inside Coq, we denote literals by
integers, and clauses by lists of integers. Antecedents (denoting the input clauses) in a
proof chain are represented by integers and a proof chain itself by a list of integers. A
resolution proof is represented internally in our implementation by a table consisting
of (key,binding) pairs. The key for this table is the identifier obtained from the proof
chains read from the input proof trace file. The binding of this table is the actual re-
solvent obtained by resolving the clauses specified (in the proof trace). When the input
proof trace is read, the identifier corresponding to the first row of the proof chain be-
comes the starting point for resolution checking. Once the resolvent is calculated for
this the process is repeated for all the remaining rows of the proof chain, until we reach
the end of the trace input. If the identifier for the last row of the proof chain denotes an
empty resolvent, we conclude that the given problem and its trace represents an UNSAT
instance.
We use the usual notation for quantifiers (∀, ∃) and logical connectives (∧,∨,¬) but
distinguish implication over propositions (⊃) and over types (→) for presentation clar-
ity, though inside Coq they are exactly the same. The notation⇒ is used during pattern
matching (using match− with) as in other functional languages. For type annotation
we use :, and for the cons operation on lists we use ::. The empty list is denoted by nil .
The set of integers is denoted by Z , the type of polymorphic list by list and the list
of integers by list Z . List containment is represented by ∈ and its negation by /∈. The
function abs computes the absolute value of an integer. We use the keyword Definition
to present our function definitions. It is akin to defining functions in Coq. Main data
structures that we used in the Coq formalization are lists, and finite maps (hashtables
with integer keys and polymorphic bindings).
We define our resolution function (./) with the help of two auxiliary functions
union and auxunion . Both functions compute the union of two clauses represented
as integer lists, but differ in their behavior when they encounter complementary literals:
whereas union removes both literals and then calls auxunion to process the remainder
of the lists; auxunion copies both the literals into the output and thus produces a tauto-
logical clause. Ideally, if the SAT solver is sound and the proof trace reflects the sound
outcome, then for any pair of clauses that are resolved, there will be only one pair of
complementary literals and we do not need two functions. However in reality, a solver
or its proof trace can have bugs and it can create instances of clauses in the trace with
multiple complementary pair of literals. Hence, we employ the two auxiliary functions
to ensure that the resolution function deals with this in a sound way.
We will later explain in more detail the functionality of the auxiliary functions but
both functions expect the input clauses to respect three well-formedness criteria: there
should be no duplicates in the clauses (NoDup); there should be no complementary
pair of literals within any clause (NoCompPair ), and the clauses should be sorted by
absolute value (sorted ). The predicate Wf encapsulates these properties.
Definition Wf c = NoCompPair c ∧ NoDup c ∧ sorted c
The assumptions that there are no duplicates and no complementary pair of literal
within a clause are essentially the constraints imposed on input clauses when the reso-
lution function is applied in practice. Sorting is enforced by us to keep the complexity
of our algorithm linear.
The union function takes a pair of sorted (by absolute value) lists of integers, and an
accumulator list, and computes the resolvent by doing a pointwise comparison on input
literals.
Definition union (c1 c2 : list Z )(acc : list Z ) =
match c1 , c2 with
| nil , c2 ⇒ app (rev acc) c2
| c1 ,nil ⇒ app (rev acc) c1
| x :: xs , y :: ys ⇒ if (x + y = 0) then auxunion xs ys acc
else if (abs x < abs y) then union xs (y :: ys)(x :: acc)
else if (abs y < abs x ) then union (x :: xs) ys (y :: acc)
else union xs ys (x :: acc)
We already pointed out above that this function and the auxiliary union function -
auxunion (shown below) that it employs are different in behaviour if the literals being
compared are complementary. However, when the literals are non-complementary, if
they are equal, only one copy is put in the resolvent whilst when they are unequal both
are kept in the resolvent. Once a single run of any of the clauses is finished, the other
clause is merged with the accumulator. Actual sorting in our case is done by simply
reversing the accumulator (since all elements are in descending order).
Definition auxunion (c1 c2 : list Z )(acc : list Z ) =
match c1 , c2 with
| nil , c2 ⇒ app (rev acc) c2
| c1 ,nil ⇒ app (rev acc) c1
| x :: xs , y :: ys ⇒ if (abs x < abs y) then auxunion xs (y :: ys) (x :: acc)
else if (abs y < abs x ) then auxunion (x :: xs) ys (y :: acc)
else if x=y then auxunion xs ys (x :: acc)
else auxunion xs ys (x :: y :: acc)
We can now show the actual resolution function denoted by ./ below. It makes use
of the union function.
Definition c1 ./ c2 = (union c1 c2 nil )
Given a problem representation in CNF form and a proof trace that respects the well-
formedness criterion and is a trivial resolution proof for the given problem, SHRUTI
will deduce the empty clause and thus validate the solver’s UNSAT claim. Conversely,
whenever SHRUTI validates a claim, the problem is indeed UNSAT—SHRUTI will
never deduce an empty clause for a SAT instance and will thus never give a false posi-
tive.
If SHRUTI cannot deduce the empty clause, it invalidates the claim. This situation
can be caused by three different reasons. First, counter to the claim the problem is SAT.
Second, the problem may be UNSAT but the resolution proof may not represent this
because it may have bugs. Third, the traces either do not respect the well-formedness
criteria, or do not represent a trivial resolution proof. In this case both the problem and
the proof may represent an UNSAT instance but our checker cannot validate it as such.
In this respect our checker is incomplete.
3.2 Soundness of the resolution function
Here we formalize the soundness criteria for our checker and present the soundness
theorem stating that the definition of our resolution function is sound. We need to prove
that the resolvent of a given pair of clauses is logically entailed by the two clauses. Thus
at a high-level we need to prove that:
∀c1 c2 c3 · (c3 = c1 ./ c2) ⊃ {c1, c2} |= c3
where |= denotes the logical entailment.
We can use the deduction theorem
∀a b c · {a, b} |= c ≡ (a ∧ b ⊃ c)
to re-state what we intuitively would like to prove:
∀c1 c2 · (c1 ∧ c2) ⊃ (c1 ./ c2)
However instead of proving the above theorem directly we prove its contraposition:
∀c1c2 · ¬(c1 ./ c2) ⊃ ¬(c1 ∧ c2)
In our formalization a clause is denoted by a list of non-zero integers, and a con-
junction of clauses is denoted by a list of clauses. We now present the definition of the
logical disjunction and conjunction functions that operate on the integer list represen-
tation of clauses. We do this with the help of an interpretation function that maps an
integer to a Boolean value.
The function Eval shown below maps a list of integers to a Boolean value by using
the logical disjunction ∨ and an interpretation I of the type Z → Bool.
Definition Eval nil I = False
Eval (x :: xs) I = Eval x I ∨ (Eval xs I)
We now define what it means to perform a conjunction over a list of clauses. The
function And shown below takes a list of clauses and an interpretation I (with type
Z → Bool) and returns a Boolean which denotes the conjunction of all the clauses in
the list.
Definition And nil I = True
And (x :: xs) I = (Eval x I) ∧ (And xs I)
The interpretations that we are interested in are the logical interpretations which
means that if we apply an interpretation I on a negative integer the value returned is the
logical negation of the value returned when the same interpretation is applied on the
positive integer.
Definition Logical I = ∀(x : Z) · I(−x) = ¬(I x)
Thus we can now state the precise statement of the soundness theorem that we
proved for our checker as:
Theorem 1. Soundness theorem
∀c1c2 · ∀ I · Logical I ⊃ ¬(Eval (c1 ./ c2) I) ⊃ ¬(And [c1, c2] I)
Proof. The proof begins by structural induction on c1 and c2. The first three sub-goals
are easily proven by term rewriting and simplification by unfolding the definitions of
./, Eval and And. The last sub-goal is proven by doing a case split on if-then-else
and then using a combination of induction hypothesis and generating conflict among
some of the assumptions. A detailed transcription of the Coq proof is available from
http://sites.google.com/site/certifiedsat/.
3.3 Correctness of Implementation
Further to ensure that the formalization of our checker is correct we check that the union
function is implemented correctly. We check that it preserves the following properties
of the trivial resolution function. These properties are:
1. A pair of complementary literals is deleted in the resolvent obtained from resolving
a given pair of clauses (Theorem 2).
2. All non-complementary pair of literals that are unequal are retained in the resolvent
(Theorem 3).
3. For a given pair of clauses, if there are no duplicate literals within each clause, then
for a literal that exists in both the clauses of the pair, only one copy of the literal is
retained in the resolvent (Theorem 4).
We have proven these properties in Coq. The actual proof consists of proving several
small and big lemmas - in total about 4000 lines of proof script in Coq (see the proofs
online).
The general strategy is to use structural induction on clauses c1 and c2 . For each
theorem, this results in four main goals, three of which are proven by contradiction since
for all elements `, ` /∈ nil. For the remaining goal a case-split is done on if-then-else,
thereby producing sub-goals, some of whom are proven from induction hypotheses, and
some from conflicting assumptions arising from the case-split.
Theorem 2. A pair of complementary literals is deleted.
∀c1 c2 · Wf c1 ⊃ Wf c2 ⊃ UniqueCompPair c1 c2 ⊃
∀`1 `2 · (`1 ∈ c1 ) ⊃ (`2 ∈ c2 ) ⊃ (`1 + `2 = 0) ⊃
(`1 /∈ (c1 ./ c2 )) ∧ (`2 /∈ (c1 ./ c2 ))
Note that to ensure that only a single pair of complementary literals is deleted we
need to assume that there is a unique complementary pair (UniqueCompPair ). The
above theorem will not hold for the case with multiple complementary pairs.
For the following theorem we need to assert in the assumption that for any literal in
one clause there exists no literal in the other clause such that the sum of two literals is
0. This is defined by the predicate NoCompLit .
Theorem 3. All non-complementary, unequal literals are retained.
∀c1 c2 · Wf c1 ⊃ Wf c2 ⊃
∀`1 `2 · (`1 ∈ c1 ) ⊃ (`2 ∈ c2 ) ⊃
(NoCompLit `1 c2) ⊃ (NoCompLit `2 c1) ⊃
(`1 6= `2) ⊃ (`1 ∈ (c1 ./ c2 )) ∧ (`2 ∈ (c1 ./ c2 ))
Theorem 4. Only one copy of equal literals is retained (factoring).
∀c1 c2 · Wf c1 ⊃ Wf c2 ⊃
∀`1 `2 · (`1 ∈ c1 ) ⊃ (`2 ∈ c2 ) ⊃ (`1 = `2) ⊃
((`1 ∈ (c1 ./ c2 )) ∧ (count `1 (c1 ./ c2 ) = 1))
In order to check the resolution steps for each row, one has to collect the actual
clauses corresponding to their identifiers and this is done by the findClause function.
The function findClause takes a list of clause identifiers (dlst), an accumulator (acc) to
collect the list of clauses, and requires as input a table that has the information about all
the input clauses (ctbl ). If a clause id is processed, then its resolvent is fetched from the
resolvent table (rtbl ), else obtained from ctbl . If there is no entry for a given id in the
resolvent table and in the clause table, an error is signalled. This error denotes the fact
that there was an input/output problem with the proof trace file due to which some input
clauses in the proof trace could not be accessed properly. This could have happened
either because the proof trace was ill-formed accidentally or wilfully tampered with.
The function that uses the ./ function recursively on a list of input clause chain is
called chainResolution and it simply folds the ./ function from left to right for every
row in the proof part of the proof trace file.
Definition chainResolution lst =
match (lst : list (list Z )) with
| nil ⇒ nil
| (x :: xs)⇒ List .fold left (./) xs x
The function findAndResolve is our last function defined in Coq world for Unsat check-
ing and provides a wrapper on other functions. Once the input clause file and proof trace
files are opened and read into different tables, findAndResolve starts the checking pro-
cess by first obtaining the clause ids from the proof part of the proof trace file, and then
invoking findClause to collect all the clauses for each row in the proof part of the proof
trace file. Once all the clauses are obtained the function chainResolution is called and
applied on the list of clauses row by row. For each row the resolvent is stored in a sep-
arate table. The checker then simply checks if the last row has an empty clause, and if
there is one, it agrees with the sat solver and says yes, the problem is UNSAT, else no.
If the proof trace part of the trace file contains nothing (ill-formed) then there would
be no entry for an identifier in the trace table (ttbl ), and this is signalled by en error state
consisting of a list with a single zero. Since zeros are otherwise prohibited to be a legal
part of the CNF problem description, we use them to signal error states. Similarly, if the
clause and trace table both are empty, then a list with two zeros is output as an error.
3.4 Program Extraction
We extract the OCaml code by using the built-in extraction API in Coq. At the time of
extraction we mapped several Coq datatypes and data structures to equivalent OCaml
ones. For optimization we made the following replacements:
1. Coq Booleans by OCaml Booleans.
2. Coq integers (Z) by OCaml int.
3. Coq lists by OCaml lists.
4. Coq finite map by OCaml’s finite map.
5. The combination of app and rev on lists in the function union , and auxunion was
replaced by the tail-recursive List.rev append in OCaml.
Replacing Coq Zs with OCaml integers gave a performance boost by a factor of 7-
10. Making minor adjustments by replacing the Coq finite maps by OCaml ones and
using tail recursive functions gave a further 20% improvement. An important conse-
quence of our extraction is that only some datatypes, and data structures get mapped to
OCaml’s; the key logical functionality is unmodified. The decisions for making changes
in data types and data structures are a standard procedure in any extraction process using
Coq [2].
Table 1: Comparison of our results with HOL 4 and Tracecheck. Number of Resolutions
(inferences) shown for HOL 4 is the number that HOL 4 calculated from the proof trace
obtained from running ZVerify - the uncertified checker (for zChaff) that Amjad used to obtain
the proof trace. SHRUTI Resolution count is obtained from the proof trace generated by the
uncertified checker Tracecheck. In terms of inferences/second, we are 1.5 to 32 times faster than
Amjad’s HOL 4 checker, whilst a factor 2.5 slower than Tracecheck. All times shown are total
times for all the three checkers.The symbol z? denotes that zChaff timed out after an hour.
No. Benchmark HOL 4 SHRUTI Tracecheck
Resolutions Time inf/sec Resolutions Time inf/s Time inf/s
1. een-tip-uns-numsv-t5.B 89136 4.61 19335 122816 0.86 142809 0.36 341155
2. een-pico-prop01-75 205807 5.70 36106 246430 1.67 147562 0.48 513395
3. een-pico-prop05-50 1804983 58.41 30901 2804173 20.76 135075 8.11 345767
4. hoons-vbmc-lucky7 3460518 59.65 58013 4359478 35.18 123919 12.95 336639
5. ibm-2002-26r-k45 1448 24.76 58 1105 0.004 276250 0.04 27625
6. ibm-2004-26-k25 1020 11.78 86 1132 0.004 283000 0.04 28300
7. ibm-2004-3 02 1-k95 69454 5.03 13807 114794 0.71 161681 0.35 327982
8. ibm-2004-6 02 3-k100 111415 7.04 15825 126873 0.9 140970 0.40 317182
9. ibm-2002-07r-k100 141501 2.82 50177 255159 1.62 157505 0.54 472516
10. ibm-2004-1 11-k25 534002 13.88 38472 255544 1.77 144375 0.75 340725
11. ibm-2004-2 14-k45 988995 31.16 31739 701430 5.42 129415 1.85 379151
12. ibm-2004-2 02 1-k100 1589429 24.17 65760 1009393 7.42 136036 3.02 334236
13. ibm-2004-3 11-k60 z? z? - 13982558 133.05 105092 59.27 235912
14. manol-pipe-g6bi 82890 2.12 39099 245222 1.59 154227 0.50 490444
15. manol-pipe-c9nidw s 700084 26.79 26132 265931 1.81 146923 0.54 492464
16. manol-pipe-c10id s 36682 11.23 3266 395897 2.60 152268 0.82 482801
17. manol-pipe-c10nidw s z? z? - 458042 3.06 149686 1.21 381701
18. manol-pipe-g7nidw 325509 8.82 36905 788790 5.40 146072 1.98 398378
19. manol-pipe-c9 198446 3.15 62998 863749 6.29 137320 2.50 345499
20. manol-pipe-f6bi 104401 5.07 20591 1058871 7.89 134204 2.97 356522
21. manol-pipe-c7b i 806583 13.76 58617 4666001 38.03 122692 15.54 300257
22. manol-pipe-c7b 824716 14.31 57632 4901713 42.31 115852 18 272317
23. manol-pipe-g10id 775605 23.21 33416 6092862 50.82 119891 21.08 289035
24. manol-pipe-g10b 2719959 52.90 51416 7827637 64.69 121002 26.85 291532
25. manol-pipe-f7idw 956072 35.17 27184 7665865 68.14 112501 30.74 249377
26. manol-pipe-g10bidw 4107275 125.82 32644 14776611 134.92 109521 68.13 216888
4 Experimental Results
We evaluated our certified checker SHRUTI on a set of benchmarks from the SAT Races
of 2006 and 2008 and the SAT Competition of 2007. We present our results on a sample
of the SAT Race Benchmarks in Table 1. The results for SHRUTI shown in the table
are for validating proof traces obtained from the PicoSAT solver. Our experiments were
carried out on a server running Red Hat on a dual-core 3 GHz, Intel Xeon CPU with
28GB memory.
The HOL 4 and Isabelle based checkers [22] were evaluated on the SAT Race
Benchmarks shown in the table [21]. Isabelle reported segmentation faults on most
of the problems, whilst HOL 4’s results are summarized along with our’s in Table 1.
HOL 4 was run on an AMD dual-core 3.2 GHz processor running Ubuntu with 4GB of
memory. We also compare our timings with that obtained from the uncertified checker
Tracecheck. Since the size of the proof traces obtained from zChaff is substantially
different than the size of the traces obtained from Tracecheck on most problems, we
decided to compare the speed of our checker with HOL 4 and Tracecheck in terms of
resolutions (inferences) solved per second. We observe that in terms of inferences/sec
we are 1.5 to 32 times faster than HOL 4 and 2.5 times slower than Tracecheck. Times
shown for all the three checkers in the table are the total times including time spent
on actual resolution checking, file I/O and garbage collection. Amjad reported that the
version of the checker he has used on these benchmarks is much faster than the one
published in [22].
As a proof of concept we also validated the proof traces from zChaff by translating
them to PicoSAT’s trace format. The performance of SHRUTI in terms of inf/sec on
the translated proof traces (from zChaff to PicoSAT) was similar to the performance of
SHRUTI when it checked PicoSAT’s traces obtained directly from the PicoSAT solver
– something that is to be expected.
4.1 Discussion
The Coq formalization consisted of 8 main function definitions amounting to nearly
160 lines of code, and 4 main theorems shown in the paper and 4 more that are about
maps (not shown here due to space). Overall the proof in Coq was nearly 4000 lines
consisting of the proofs of several big and small lemmas that were essential to prove
the 4 main theorems. The extracted OCaml code was approximately 2446 lines, and the
OCaml glue code was 324 lines.
We found that there is no implementation of the array data type which meant that
we had to use the type of list. Since lists are defined inductively, it is easier to do
reasoning with them, although implementing very fast and efficient functions on these
is impossible. In a recent development related to Coq, there has been an emergence of
a tool called Ynot [14] that can deal with arrays, pointers and file related I/O in a Hoare
Type Theory. Future work in certification using Coq should definitely investigate the
relevance and use of this.
We noticed that the OCaml compiler’s native code compilation does produce effi-
cient binaries but the default settings for automatic garbage collection were not useful.
We observed that if we do not tune the runtime environment settings of OCaml by set-
ting the values of OCMALRUNPARAM, as soon as the input proof traces had more than
a million inferences, garbage collection would kick in so severely that it will end up
consuming (and thereby delaying the overall computation) as much as 60% of the total
time. By setting the initial size of major heap to a large value such as 2 GB and making
the garbage collection less eager, we noticed that the computation times of our checker
got reduced by upto a factor of 7 on proof traces with over 1 million inferences.
5 Related Work
Recent work on checking the result of SAT solvers can be traced to the work of Zhang
& Malik [23] and Goldberg & Novikov [8], with additional insights provided in recent
work [1,19]. Besides Weber and Amjad, others who have advocated the use of a checker
include Bulwahn et al [5] who experimented with the idea of doing reflective theorem
proving in Isabelle and suggested that it can be used for designing a SAT checker.
In a recent paper [12], Maric´ presented a formalization of SAT solving algorithms
in Isabelle that are used in modern day SAT solvers. An important difference is that
whereas we have formalized a SAT checker and extracted an executable code from
the formalization itself, Maric´ formalizes a SAT solver (at the abstract level of state
machines) and then implements the verified algorithm in the SAT solver off-line.
An alternative line of work involves the formal development of SAT solvers. Ex-
amples include the work of Smith & Westfold [18] and the work of Lescuyer and Con-
chon [11]. Lescuyer and Conchon have formalized a simplified SAT solver in Coq and
extracted an executable. However, the performance results have not been reported on
any industrial benchmarks. This is because they have not formalized several of the key
techniques used in modern SAT solvers. The work of of Smith & Westfold involves the
formal synthesis of a SAT solver from a high level description. Albeit ambitious, the
preliminary version of the SAT solver does not include the most effective techniques
used in modern SAT solvers.
There has been a recent surge in the area of certifying SMT solvers. M. Moskal
recently provided an efficient certification technique for SMT solvers [13] using term-
rewriting systems. The soundness of the proof checker is guaranteed through a formal-
ization using inference rules provided in a term-rewriting formalism. L. de Moura and
N. Bjørner [6] presented the proof and model generating features of the state-of-the-art
SMT solver Z3.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a methodology for performing efficient yet formally certified
SAT solving. The key feature of our approach is that we did a one-off formal design and
reasoning of the checker using Coq proof-assistant and extracted an OCaml program
which was used as a standalone executable to check the outcome of industrial-strength
SAT solvers such as PicoSAT and zChaff. Our certified checker can be plugged in with
any proof generating SAT solver with previously agreed certificates for satisfiable and
unsatisfiable problems. On one hand our checker provides much higher assurance as
compared to uncertified checkers such as Tracecheck and on the other it enhances us-
ability and performance when compared to the certified checkers implemented in HOL
4 and Isabelle. In this regard our approach provides an arguably optimal middle ground
between the two extremes. We are investigating on optimizing the performance aspects
of our checker even further so that the slight difference in overall performance between
uncertified checkers and us can be further minimized.
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